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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the possibility that the increases in within-country economic 
inequality that were observed in many countries since the 1980s were caused by 
deepening globalization through uneven capital accumulation across households by 
constructing a model based on the concept of sustainable heterogeneity. The model 
indicates that unless a government strengthens social welfare measures appropriately as 
globalization deepens (i.e., increases transfers from more-advantaged households to less-
advantaged households), the level of within-country economic inequality will continue to 
increase. This result indicates the recent increases in within-country economic inequality 
may have been caused at least partially by the inaction of governments in the face of 
increasing globalization.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Various empirical studies have concluded that within-country income inequality has 
increased in many countries since the 1980s (Piketty, 2003, 2013; Piketty and Saez, 2003; 
Atkinson et al., 2011; Parker, 2014). The income share of the top decile has notably 
increased, particularly in the United States and other English-speaking developed 
countries. In addition, within-country wealth inequality has also increased in many 
countries during the same period (Piketty, 2013; Saez and Zucman, 2016). The large 
increase in income inequality in the United States seems to be largely a result of 
substantial increases in the salaries of company executives (Piketty, 2013). However, 
even after removing the effect of increases in executives’ salaries, several of the empirical 
studies noted above indicate that within-country income inequality has still increased in 
many countries since the 1980s. This common trend implies that there is some underlying 
factor that has caused this increase.  
 Several explanations for the increase in income inequality have been presented. 
Skill-biased technological change (SBTC) was a favored explanation until the early 2000s 
(Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et al., 1998, 2003). However, SBTC has not been 
sufficiently supported empirically as a reason (Card and DiNardo, 2002). Explanations 
based on globalization have been also widely accepted—particularly those based on the 
Stolper–Samuelson theorem. These argue that globalization has deepened since the 1980s 
in the sense that more countries have become increasingly open or have substantially 
reduced regulations on international transactions. However, this explanation also has not 
been sufficiently supported empirically (Leamer, 1998; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). 
Hence, since the 2000s, globalization-based explanations have changed their main 
underlying mechanisms from those based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem to those 
based on heterogeneity of firms, labor market frictions, and offshoring of tasks (Helpman, 
2016). Recently, Piketty (2013) presented a different explanation for recent increases in 
income inequality: he attributed increases in income and wealth inequalities to uneven 
capital accumulation across households.  
 Piketty (2013) does not necessarily maintain that uneven capital accumulation 
and deepening globalization are closely related, but they are certainly closely related, 
because capital accumulation in an open economy is greatly affected by international 
transactions, and capital can move more freely across national borders as globalization 
deepens. Hence, it is possible that deepening globalization has made capital accumulation 
across households more uneven and has thereby increased within-country income 
inequality. In this paper, this possibility is examined by constructing a model based on 
the concept of sustainable heterogeneity (SH).  
 The SH concept was first presented by Harashima (2010, 2017). An important 
 2 
aspect of SH is that, although households are heterogeneous in preferences and 
productivity, there is a unique balanced growth path (or steady state) on which all 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. However, 
this path (or state) is politically vulnerable and is not necessarily achieved naturally: 
interventions by the authority (i.e., government) are required to achieve SH in some cases. 
Particularly, forced financial transfers from relatively more-advantaged households to 
less-advantaged households are necessary.  
 Under floating exchange rates, international SH between two countries is 
naturally achieved (Harashima, 2015b). Therefore, even if globalization deepens, 
international SH is guaranteed to be naturally held under floating exchange rates. 
However, there is no guarantee that SH will hold within each country, even under floating 
exchange rates. Particularly, if heterogeneous households behave unilaterally, within-
country SH will not be naturally achieved. If SH is not achieved, the magnitude of within-
country income inequality will continue to increase to an upper limit. In this paper, I 
examine the possibility that, as globalization deepens, within-country income inequalities 
will accelerate through uneven capital accumulation because within-country SH is not 
naturally achieved.   
 
2  ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
 
2.1  Skill-biased technological change (SBTC) 
In the last decade of the 20th century and in the early 2000s, SBTC was the most favored 
explanation for increasing within-country wage inequality (Katz and Murphy, 1992; 
Autor et al., 1998, 2003). SBTC means that technological progress has been biased in 
favor of skilled workers as compared with unskilled workers. In this explanation, because 
SBTC induced changes in the demand for workers, the wages for skilled workers 
increased and those for unskilled workers decreased; therefore, inequality widened. 
SBTC was often combined with globalization as the mechanism to explain the increase 
in inequality; in particular, it was combined with the Stolper–Samuelson theorem (see 
Section 2.2.1). However, SBTC as an explanation has not been sufficiently supported 
empirically (Card and DiNardo, 2002). For example, the predictions based on SBTC are 
not sufficiently consistent with actual productivity growth in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
2.2  Globalization 
2.2.1  The Stolper–Samuelson theorem  
Globalization has been regarded as another important source of increases in within-
country wage inequality. In the last few decades of the 20th century, the causality between 
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inequality and globalization was explained mainly on the basis of the Heckscher–Ohlin 
model—or more specifically, the Stolper–Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 
1941). It predicts that because workers in developing countries are generally low skilled, 
opening trade between developed and developing countries results in a decrease in wages 
for low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers in developed countries.  
 However, as with SBTC, the combined effect of globalization and the Stolper–
Samuelson theorem has not been sufficiently supported empirically (e.g., Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007). Leamer (1998) concluded that this effect could be observed in the 1970s, 
but not in the 1980s. In addition, a crucial problem is that wage inequalities in many 
developing countries have also increased after trade liberalization, even though the 
Stolper–Samuelson theorem predicts that they should decrease in these countries.  
 
2.2.2  Other theories on globalization and inequality 
Other channels that link globalization with within-country inequality have also been 
explored (Helpman, 2016). These include:  
 
(1) Heterogeneity of firms 
Firms are heterogeneous, particularly among exporters and non-exporters. Melitz (2003) 
constructed a model that describes this heterogeneity, and on the basis of the model, 
showed that globalization caused increases in within-country wage inequality. 
 
(2) Labor-market frictions 
There are frictions, such as minimum wages, firing costs, and the cost of finding a job, in 
the labor market. If the mobility of labor is limited across industries by some of these 
frictions, wages will differ across industries. In addition, the impacts of globalization will 
vary across industries. Therefore, globalization will influence within-country wage 
inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005).  
 
(3) Offshoring of tasks (outsourcing) 
Many firms that are headquartered in developed countries produce intermediate goods in 
developing countries: that is, they outsource the production of intermediate goods. This 
outsourcing will change the demands for skilled and unskilled workers in opposite 
directions and will therefore result in increases in within-country wage inequalities 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997).  
 
2.3  Divergence in capital accumulation 
Piketty (2013) showed that the recent increases in within-country income and wealth 
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inequalities were a result of uneven capital accumulation across households (i.e., the rich 
are getting richer). Piketty (2013) showed that the wealth share of the top 1% or 10% of 
wealth holders has increased in the U.S. and Europe since the 1980s.  
   
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
3.1  Sustainable heterogeneity (SH)  
SH is defined as the state in which all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous 
households are indefinitely satisfied. Three heterogeneities―time preference, risk 
aversion, and productivity―are considered. Suppose that there are H ( ) economies 
that are identical except for the rate of time preference, the degree of risk aversion, and 
productivity. Each economy is interpreted as representing a group of identical households, 
and the population in each economy is constant. The economies are fully open to each 
other, and goods and services and capital are freely transacted among them, but labor is 
immobilized in each economy. Note that households also provide laborers whose abilities 
are one of the factors that determine the productivity of each economy. Each economy 
can be interpreted as representing either a country or a group of identical households in a 
country.  
 The model shown by Harashima (2010, 2017) indicates that if and only if 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
= (
∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
)
−1
{[
𝜛𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)
]
𝛼
−
∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
}        (1) 
 
for any economy i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous 
economies are satisfied, and 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑡
𝑘𝑖,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑡
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑡
𝐴𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
𝑑 ∫ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 
 
for any i and j (i ≠ j), where ci,t, ki,t, and yi,t are per capita consumption, capital, and output 
of economy i in period t, respectively; θi, εi, and ωi are the rate of time preference, degree 
of risk aversion, and productivity of economy i, respectively; At is the technology in 
period t; and α, m, v, and are constants. In addition, is the current account balance 
of economy i with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. SH is the 
N
 tjiτ ,,
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state that satisfies equation (1).  
 
3.2  SH with government intervention 
If the exchange rates between two countries are floating, SH between the two countries 
is naturally achieved and maintained (Harashima, 2015b), but SH is not necessarily 
naturally achieved within each country if economies (i.e., the households that make up 
the economies) behave unilaterally (Harashima, 2010, 2017). However, if the government 
of a country appropriately intervenes (e.g., it properly transfers money from some 
economies to other economies in the country), SH within each country can be achieved 
even though economies behave unilaterally.   
 
3.2.1 Heterogeneous time preference model 
I first examine the case where H = 2 in a country (i.e., a country is made up of Economies 
1 and 2). The government intervenes in the activities of Economies 1 and 2 by transferring 
money from Economy 1 to Economy 2. The transfer amount in period t is gt, it is assumed 
that gt depends on capital such that 
 
g
𝑡
= g̅
𝑡
𝑘1,𝑡 . 
 
g̅
𝑡
 is an exogenous variable for households and is appropriately adjusted by the 
government in every period so as to achieve SH. Harashima (2012) showed that if a 
government appropriately intervenes such that 
 
  lim 
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃2 − 𝜃1
2
 , 
 
then  
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]                    (3) 
 
 
can be achieved. Equation (3) is identical to the condition for SH between Economies 1 
and 2.  
 
3.2.2 Multi-economy heterogeneous time preference model 
Next, I examine the case where the number of economies is more than two in a country. 
If SH is achieved among Economies 1, 2, … , and (H – 1), these economies can be seen 
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as a combined economy. Let Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) be such a combined economy. 
If a government appropriately intervenes by transferring money from Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ 
+ (H – 1) to Economy H such that  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
 g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃𝐻 −
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
𝐻 − 1
𝐻
 ,                                             (4) 
 
then 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
𝐻
]                              (5) 
 
can be achieved for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (5) is identical to the condition for SH 
among H economies.  
 
3.2.3 Multi-economy multiple-element model  
Similarly, if a government appropriately intervenes by transferring from Economy 1+2+ 
∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) to Economy H such that  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
 g̅
𝑡
= (
∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
𝜔𝐻
)
−1
{
𝜀𝐻 ∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1 − ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
[
𝜛𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)
]
𝛼
−
𝜀𝐻 ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1 − 𝜃𝐻 ∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
} , 
 
then 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
= (
∑ 𝜀𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
)
−1
{[
𝜛𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
𝐻𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)
]
𝛼
−
∑ 𝜃𝑞𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
∑ 𝜔𝑞
𝐻
𝑞=1
}                  (6) 
 
can be achieved for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (6) is identical to the condition for SH 
among H economies.  
 
4  THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON 
INEQUALITY 
 
4.1  The model 
For simplicity, a two-country heterogeneous time preference model is used to examine 
the impact of globalization on within-country inequality. This model can be easily 
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extended to a multi-country, multiple-element model as was shown in Section 3. There 
are two countries (Country X and Country Z) and each country consists of two economies 
(Economy 1 and Economy 2). Let Economy i, j be Economy j in Country i where i = X 
or Z and j = 1 or 2. The populations, productivities, and preferences of the economies are 
identical except for the rate of time preference. Let jiθ , be the rate of time preference of 
Economy i, j, and 2,1, ii θθ  . In addition, for simplicity, suppose that 𝜃𝑋,1 < 𝜃𝑋,2 = 𝜃𝑍,1 <
𝜃𝑍,2. Any economy in both countries behaves unilaterally. 
 Initially the two countries are closed, but they are later opened to trade with each 
other. After the opening, goods, services, and capital move freely between the two 
countries but labor is still immobilized within each economy. Before the opening, the 
equilibrium amounts of per capita capital are different between the two countries. Let kX 
and kZ be the per capita capital before the opening in Countries X and Z, respectively. 
After the opening, the equilibrium amounts of per capita capital in both countries become 
identical through arbitrage. Let k be the common per capita capital after the opening. 
Because 𝜃𝑋,1 < 𝜃𝑋,2 = 𝜃𝑍,1 < 𝜃𝑍,2, then 𝑘𝑋 > ?̅? > 𝑘𝑍. 
 Because any economy in both countries behaves unilaterally regardless of 
whether it is before and after the opening, each government has to appropriately intervene 
(i.e., transfer money from one economy to the other within each country) to achieve SH 
within the country. Let jig , be lim𝑡→∞
 g̅
𝑡
 with regard to the (positive or negative) transfer to 
Economy i, j.  
 
4.2  Transfers before the opening 
Let ǧi,j be jig ,  when SH is achieved within a country before the opening. By equation 
(2), the necessary transfer to Economy X, 1 to achieve SH in Country X before the opening 
is  
 
𝑘𝑋ǧ𝑋,1 = −𝑘𝑋
𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1
2
< 0 ,                                         (7) 
 
and that to Economy X, 2 is  
 
𝑘𝑋ǧ𝑋,2 = 𝑘𝑋
𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1
2
> 0 .                                           (8) 
 
That is, the government of Country X transfers 
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𝑘𝑋
𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1
2
 
 
from Economy X, 1 to Economy X, 2 to achieve SH in Country X.  
 Similarly, by equation (2), the necessary transfer to Economy Z, 1 to achieve SH 
in Country Z before the opening is 
 
𝑘𝑍ǧ𝑍,1 = −𝑘𝑍
𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1
2
< 0 ,                                          (9) 
 
and that to Economy Z, 2 is  
 
𝑘𝑍ǧ𝑍,2 = 𝑘𝑍
𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1
2
> 0 .                                         (10) 
 
The government of Country Z transfers 
 
𝑘𝑍
𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1
2
 
 
from Economy Z, 1 to Economy Z, 2 to achieve SH in Country Z. 
 Suppose that, before the opening, each government appropriately intervenes to 
achieve within-country SH, i.e., it completely implements the transfers as shown above.  
 
4.3  Transfers after the opening 
Even after the opening, government intervention is still necessary for SH to be maintained 
within each country, because all economy still behaves unilaterally. On the other hand, if 
the exchange rates are floating, SH between the two countries is naturally achieved and 
maintained (Harashima, 2015b), although within-country SH is not necessarily 
guaranteed. Nevertheless, because this naturally established SH between the countries is 
equivalent to a forced SH through transfers by an international authority, as shown by 
Harashima (2012), it is assumed for simplicity that SH between the two countries is 
established through transfers between the two countries by some international authority. 
As will be shown in Section 4.3.2, money is transferred from Country X to Country Z to 
achieve SH between the two countries. Let 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 be this positive transfer from Country 
X to Country Z.  
 The economy burdened with the transfer contribution from Country X and the 
one that receives the transfer within Country Z differ depending on how each government 
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behaves.  
 
4.3.1  Necessary transfers for SH among economies  
First, I examine the case in which both governments behave so as to achieve SH within 
their countries considering 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 . In this case, the allocation of 𝑇𝑋→𝑍  between the 
economies within each country is made by each government; that is, each government 
determines which economy is burdened with, or receives, 𝑇𝑋→𝑍  and how much they 
either pay or receive. Therefore, the transfer to each economy consists of a within-country 
transfer by the government and the allocated transfer of 𝑇𝑋→𝑍. Let g̃𝑖,𝑗 be jig ,  when SH 
is achieved within a country in this case. By equation (4), the necessary transfer to 
Economy X, 1 to achieve within-country SH is  
 
?̅?g̃
𝑋,1
= ?̅?
𝜃𝑋,1 −
𝜃𝑋,2 + 𝜃𝑍,1 + 𝜃𝑍,2
3
2
 ,                                   (11) 
 
that to Economy X, 2 is  
 
?̅?g̃
𝑋,2
= ?̅?
𝜃𝑋,2 −
𝜃𝑋,1 + 𝜃𝑍,1 + 𝜃𝑍,2
3
2
 ,                                  (12) 
 
that to Economy Z, 1 is  
 
?̅?g̃
𝑍,1
= ?̅?
𝜃𝑍,1 −
𝜃𝑋,1 + 𝜃𝑋,2 + 𝜃𝑍,2
3
2
 ,                                   (13) 
 
and that to Economy Z, 2 is  
 
?̅?g̃
𝑍,2
= ?̅?
𝜃𝑍,2 −
𝜃𝑋,1 + 𝜃𝑋,2 + 𝜃𝑍,1
3
2
 .                                   (14) 
 
 To achieve SH within each country, each government allocates part of 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 to 
each economy consistently with equations (11) and (12) or (13) and (14), respectively.  
 
4.3.2  Transfers between countries 
By equations (11), (12), (13), and (14), the amount of 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 can be calculated. By 
equations (11) and (12),  
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𝑇𝑋→𝑍 = ?̅?g̃𝑍,1 + ?̅?g̃𝑍,2 =
?̅?
3
(𝜃𝑍,1 + 𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1 − 𝜃𝑋,2) > 0.               (15) 
 
This corresponds to the negative transfer from Country Z to Country X (𝑇𝑍→𝑋), which is 
calculated by equations (13) and (14) such that 
 
𝑇𝑍→𝑋 = ?̅?g̃𝑋,1 + ?̅?g̃𝑋,2 = −
?̅?
3
(𝜃𝑍,1 + 𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1 − 𝜃𝑋,2) = −𝑇𝑋→𝑍 < 0.    (16) 
 
Inequalities (15) and (16) mean that Country Z is aided by Country X financially when 
SH between the two countries is achieved.  
 
4.3.3  Transfers if the government does not change the intervention 
Next, I examine the case where, even after the opening, both governments do not change 
the degree of intervention, such that jig ,  is not changed and is kept equal to ǧ𝑋,1, ǧ𝑋,2, 
ǧ
𝑍,1
, and ǧ
𝑍,2
. In this case, the governments relinquish the task of allocating 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 (or 
𝑇𝑍→𝑋) to their within-country economies. Suppose for simplicity that 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 (or 𝑇𝑍→𝑋) is 
instead allocated randomly to either economy in each country in each period. As a result, 
𝑇𝑋→𝑍 (or 𝑇𝑍→𝑋) eventually will be controlled by the more-advantaged economies in each 
country (i.e., Economy X, 1 and Economy Z, 1) because, if economies behave unilaterally, 
the most-advantaged economy eventually takes everything (Becker 1980). That is, 
Economy X, 1 can force Economy X, 2 to be burdened with 𝑇𝑍→𝑋 = −𝑇𝑋→𝑍 = ?̅?g̃𝑋,1 +
?̅?g̃
𝑋,2
 (i.e., it can force it to transfer all of the necessary money to Country Z) by 
unilaterally setting the initial level of consumption of Economy X, 1. On the other hand, 
Economy Z, 1 can monopolize 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 = ?̅?g̃𝑍,1 + ?̅?g̃𝑍,2  (i.e., it can receive all of the 
monetary transfer from Country X) by also unilaterally setting its initial level of 
consumption. 
 Let ĝ
𝑖,𝑗
 be jig ,  in this case. Because each country’s degree of government 
intervention is kept the same as it was before the opening (i.e., they are equal to ǧ
𝑋,1
, 
ǧ
𝑋,2
, ǧ
𝑍,1
, and ǧ
𝑍,2
), the transfer to Economy X, 1 is, by equation (7), 
 
 ?̅?ĝ
𝑋,1
= ?̅?ǧ
𝑋,1
= −?̅?
𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1
2
 .                                      (17) 
 
Conversely, the transfer to Economy X, 2 is  
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?̅?ĝ
𝑋,2
= ?̅?ǧ
𝑋,2
− 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 = ?̅?
𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1
2
− ?̅?g̃
𝑍,1
− ?̅?g̃
𝑍,2
 
= ?̅?
𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1
2
−
?̅?
3
(𝜃𝑍,1 + 𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1 − 𝜃𝑋,2)                        (18) 
 
by equations (8) and (16), because Economy X, 2 is burdened with 𝑇𝑍→𝑋 = −𝑇𝑋→𝑍 =
?̅?g̃
𝑋,1
+ ?̅?g̃
𝑋,2
. The transfer to Economy X, 2 consists of not only the within-country 
transfer by the government (?̅?ǧ
𝑋,2
) but also the burden of 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 on Country X.  
 Similarly, the transfer to Economy Z, 1 is  
 
?̅?ĝ
𝑍,1
= ?̅?ǧ
𝑍,1
+ 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 = −?̅?
𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1
2
+ ?̅?g̃
𝑍,1
+ ?̅?g̃
𝑍,2
 
= −?̅?
𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1
2
+
?̅?
3
(𝜃𝑍,1 + 𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1 − 𝜃𝑋,2)                      (19) 
 
by equations (9) and (15) because Economy Z, 1 monopolizes 𝑇𝑋→𝑍 = ?̅?g̃𝑍,1 + ?̅?g̃𝑍,2. 
The transfer to Economy Z, 1 consists of not only the within-country transfer by the 
government (?̅?ǧ
𝑍,1
) but also the transfer to Country Z from Country X (i. e. , 𝑇𝑋→𝑍). Finally, 
the transfer to Economy Z, 2 is, by equation (10),  
 
?̅?ĝ
𝑍,2
= ?̅?ǧ
𝑍,2
= ?̅?
𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1
2
.                                       (20) 
 
4.4  Within-country inequality after the opening 
4.4.1  When the government strengthens its intervention 
If a government strengthens its intervention so as to satisfy equations (11) and (12) or 
(13) and (14), within-country SH is achieved. Even if SH is achieved within the country 
through government intervention, some inequality in the level of consumption between 
the economies within the country still exists. An important point, however, is that the 
degree of inequality neither increases nor decreases in the future; in other words, it is 
stabilized. Furthermore, even though inequality exists, all optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are equally satisfied indefinitely.   
 
4.4.2.  When the government does not change the intervention 
If a government does not change the intervention after the opening, the difference in the 
transfers to Economy X, 1 is, by equations (11) and (17),  
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?̅?ĝ
𝑋,1
− ?̅?g̃
𝑋,1
=
?̅?
6
(𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1) > 0.                                  (21) 
 
Inequality (21) indicates that Economy X, 1 owes a greater amount if the government 
strengthens the intervention to achieve SH than if it does not. Conversely, the difference 
in the transfers to Economy X, 2 is, by equations (12) and (18),  
 
?̅?ĝ
𝑋,2
− ?̅?g̃
𝑋,2
= −
?̅?
6
(𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1) < 0.                                (22) 
 
Inequality (22) indicates that Economy X, 2 receives more transfers if the government 
strengthens the intervention than if it does not.  
 The difference in the transfers to Economy Z, 1 is, by equations (13) and (19), 
 
?̅?ĝ
𝑍,1
− ?̅?g̃
𝑍,1
=
?̅?
6
(𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1) > 0.                                   (23) 
 
Inequality (23) indicates that Economy Z, 1 owes a greater amount if the government 
strengthens the intervention than if it does not. Conversely, the difference in the transfers 
to Economy Z, 2 is, by equations (14) and (20),   
 
?̅?ĝ
𝑍,2
− ?̅?g̃
𝑍,2
= −
?̅?
6
(𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1) < 0.                                (24) 
 
Inequality (24) indicates that Economy Z, 2 receives more transfers if the government 
strengthens the intervention than if it does not.  
 Inequalities (21) and (22) indicate that, if the government intervention of 
Country X does not change after the opening, the positive transfer from Economy X, 1 to 
Economy X, 2 is not sufficient to achieve SH within Country X. Economy X, 1 will 
eventually hold all capital in Country X, and its consumption will be far larger than that 
of Economy X, 2. Inequality within Country X will continue to increase to the limit. In 
addition, although all optimality conditions of Economy X, 1 are indefinitely satisfied, 
those of Economy X, 2 cannot be satisfied. Inequalities (23) and (24) indicate that the 
same holds true for economies 1 and 2 in Country Z.  
 
4.5  The need to strengthen measures for social welfare 
The results shown in Section 4.4 clearly indicate that, after the opening, a government 
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should strengthen its measures for social welfare. Otherwise, within-country income and 
wealth inequalities will increase. This means that, when facing deepening globalization, 
government intervention should be enhanced to improve social welfare. In the above-
shown two-country model, equations (21) and (22) indicate that, if the government of 
Country X strengthens the measures for social welfare and additionally transfers 
 
?̅?
6
(𝜃𝑍,2 − 𝜃𝑍,1) 
 
from Economy X, 1 to Economy X, 2, then SH within Country X is achieved. Similarly, 
equations (23) and (24) indicate that if the government of Country Z additionally transfers 
 
?̅?
6
(𝜃𝑋,2 − 𝜃𝑋,1) 
 
from Economy Z, 1 to Economy Z, 2, then SH within Country Z is achieved. As 
globalization deepens, transfers from more-advantaged households to less-advantaged 
households should be increased. 
 If a government does not change the social welfare measures even after 
globalization deepens, discontent among less-advantaged households will gradually 
increase and may eventually generate a serious political conflict as within-country 
inequality increases and the optimality conditions of less-advantaged households cannot 
be satisfied. Furthermore, if a government were to misunderstand globalization as 
indicating a need for more deregulation and less intervention—that is, if it were to actually 
weaken social welfare measures—then the situation would get much worse.  
 An important point is that an increase in within-country inequality occurs equally 
in Countries X and Z if a government does not appropriately respond to the opening. This 
means that increases in within-country inequality can occur in both developed and 
developing countries as globalization deepens. The potential for political conflicts 
therefore can also occur in both countries. 
 The model in this paper also has an important implication for the euro crisis in 
the 2010s. Equations (15) and (16) indicate that the more-advantaged countries should 
transfer money to the less-advantaged countries within the euro zone. If the transfer is not 
sufficient to meet the condition shown by equations (15) and (16), the more-advantaged 
countries will get richer as the less-advantaged ones become poorer (see also Harashima, 
2015a). As a result, SH in the euro zone becomes impossible and political conflicts will 
be intensified. Nevertheless, if the more-advantaged countries coerce the less-advantaged 
countries into changing their preferences to be identical to those of the more-advantaged 
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countries (e.g., coerce them to adopt more severe austerity measures), SH can be achieved 
in the euro zone, but it is not a “true” SH, because forcing this type of change in 
preferences will make the less-advantaged countries greatly and persistently unsatisfied. 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Various empirical studies have indicated that within-country income inequality has 
increased in many countries since the 1980s, and many researchers have proposed 
common underlying factors that have made within-country income inequality increase 
commonly during this period (see Section 2). Recently, Piketty (2013) argued that 
increases in income and wealth inequalities were a result of uneven capital accumulation 
across households.  
 Uneven capital accumulation is closely related to globalization, because capital 
accumulation is greatly affected by international transactions and capital can move more 
freely internationally as globalization deepens. In this paper, this causality was examined 
on the basis of the concept of SH. Although international SH is naturally achieved under 
floating exchange rates, within-country SH is not guaranteed as the country is opened to 
international trade. The model presented in this paper indicates that, if households behave 
unilaterally and if the government does not strengthen its measures for social welfare 
appropriately as globalization deepens, more-advantaged households will accumulate 
more capital than in the case when within-country SH is achieved. Similarly, less-
advantaged households will accumulate less, and thereby income inequality between 
households will increase to the limit. This result indicates that it is extremely important 
for a government to strengthen social welfare measures appropriately (i.e., increase 
transfers from more-advantaged to less-advantaged households enough to achieve SH) as 
globalization deepens to prevent within-country inequality from increasing.  
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